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TAX-EXEMPTS AND TAX SHELTERS: SHOULD
THE SAME PERSON INVEST IN BOTH?
Robert A. Weiland*
In recent years, limited partnerships that invest in real estate have become
immensely popular among high bracket taxpayers. Investments in such
partnerships, known widely as tax shelters, are intended to result in in-
creased income to the investor primarily through decreased personal income
tax liability.
A partnership is not a taxable entity for federal income tax purposes.' Its
taxable income or loss is determined at the partnership level and is passed
through to the partners to be reported on their individual tax returns.2 This
pass-through scheme of taxation has made partnerships the most favored tax
shelter vehicle. 3
In general, tax shelter investments enable taxpayers to reduce their tax
liabilities through the use of tax benefits generated by investments. The
three most common elements of a tax shelter are: (1) the ability to defer tax
liability to a later year;4 (2) the opportunity to transform ordinary income
into capital gain;5 and (3) the use of borrowed funds to finance the invest-
* Associate, Goulston & Storrs, Boston, Mass. B.A., 1968, University of Wisconsin;
J.D., Magna cum laude, 1981, Boston College Law School.
1. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended I.R.C. § 701 (1984).
2. I.R.C. § 702(a) (1984).
3. It should, but may not, go without saying that the term "tax shelter" is not, in es-
sence, one that should have any inherent pejorative connotations. The provisions of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) that foster these investments provide incentives for economic
purposes approved of by Congress. An abusive tax shelter, on the other hand, is formed pri-
marily to obtain tax benefits without regard to the economic viability of the investment.
4. Deferral involves the acceleration of deductions resulting in an interest-free loan from
the Government. In the real estate tax shelter arena, deferral is aided by the Accelerated Cost
Recovery System (ACRS). See I.R.C. § 168 (1984).
5. Conversion may be accomplished where a taxpayer takes an accelerated deduction
against ordinary income, and the income that is eventually generated by the investment is
taxed at the capital gains rate.
Under ACRS all gain or disposition of nonresidential real property whose cost is recovered
on an accelerated basis over the allowable 18-year period (15 years in the case of low-income
housing) will be treated as ordinary income, to the extent of recovery allowances previously
taken under the prescribed accelerated method. Thus, in the case of nonresidential property,
taxpayers may either use straight line recovery with no recapture or accelerated recovery with
recapture of all recovery. deductions to the extent gain is recognized. See supra note 4.
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ments, commonly referred to as "leverage."
It is this last reason that makes real estate limited partnerships so attrac-
tive. The partnership may leverage its investment causing its depreciation
deductions to exceed its partners' equity investments. In a tax shelter, the
partnership finances a large part of the project with nonrecourse loans,
6
which are proportionately added to the tax basis of the individual limited
partners.7 The benefits of leveraging a tax shelter investment can be simply
illustrated. Assume limited partner A purchases a one-tenth interest in the
profits, losses, and capital of a limited partnership for $100,000 and the lim-
ited partnership borrows $3,000,000 (of which $300,000 is attributed to A).
A has a basis of $400,000 in his partnership interest and may claim deduc-
tions up to this amount. The partnership may depreciate the property over
fifteen years', assuming it is low-income housing,9 and pass through the de-
preciation to A to be deducted from his taxes. In year one, the depreciation
is equal to approximately $52,000.00 and thus appears as a loss on A's tax
return. Assuming A is in the 50% tax bracket, that loss is worth $26,000.00
to A.
The nonrecourse loan must, of course, be repaid. Ordinarily payments
will include both principal and interest. The partnership will make the pay-
ments and the interest payment deduction will flow through to the limited
partners. Generally, the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code) allows a
deduction of all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebted-
ness.'" Thus, in addition to claiming losses through depreciation, a limited
partner will be able to deduct the interest on his pro rata share of the loan
6. In most partnership situations, investors are limited in the deduction they may take to
the amount actually at risk in the partnership. However, the at-risk limitations do not apply to
those who invest in real estate. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (1984).
7. A partner's distributive share of the partnership's losses is limited by his basis in the
partnership. I.R.C. § 704(d) (1984). See Isley, Tax Shelter Aspects of the Limited Partnership
Real Estate Syndicate, 14 GoNz. L. REv. 855, 864-66 (1979) (a useful discourse on the limited
partners' basis in the tax shelter limited partnership area).
8. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 introduced a new system of depreciation
known as the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) based on the entire cost of deprecia-
ble improvements, regardless of whether such improvements are financed with borrowed
funds. I.R.C. § 168. See supra note 4. Under ACRS, a taxpayer is entitled to recover his cost
basis in real property over an 18-year period (15 years in the case of low-income housing).
I.R.C. §§ 168(b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(4)(A)(i) (1984). Although the straight line method can be
elected, the 200% declining balance method can be used for low-income housing in the early
years with a switch to the straight line method in the later years. Other real property can be
depreciated using the 175% declining balance method. I.R.C. §§ 168(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(4)(A)(ii)
(1984).
9. The term "low-income housing" means property described in clause (i), (ii), (iii), or
(iv) of I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1)(B) (1984). See I.R.C. § 168(c)(2)(F) (1984).
10. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1984).
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payments. This interest deduction is often crucial in an investor's decision
to purchase an interest in a real estate limited partnership."'
11. An examination of the following table, typical of that which might appear in a tax
shelter offering memorandum, explicates this point. Note that in each year the interest ex-
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Due to the tax ramifications discussed above, it is usually the taxpayer in
the upper tax brackets who chooses to invest in real estate limited partner-
ships. It may be assumed that a fair number of such investors hold govern-
mental obligations described in Code section 103.12 The interest on such
obligations is not to be included in gross income. That is, the interest is tax
free.
Code section 265(2) 13 disallows any deductions for interest paid by a tax-
payer on indebtedness incurred or continued for the purpose of purchasing
or carrying tax exempt obligations. Syndicators of real estate tax shelters
often warn potential investors that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or
Service) could take the position that a limited partner owning tax exempt
obligations is precluded from deducting his pro rata share of the partner-
ship's interest and expenses. 14 Arguments may be made that an investor
may not deduct an allocable portion of interest incurred by him to purchase
or carry his units in the partnership, since such borrowing enables him to
continue to carry his tax exempt obligations. It is the position of the author,
however, that I.R.C. section 265(2) cannot properly be applied to disallow
deductions attributable to the partnership's borrowings.
It is likely that if an individual who owns tax-exempt obligations bor-
rowed to purchase the actual unit in the partnership, the interest paid on
such loan would not be deductible pursuant to Code section 265(2). 15 In
short, the individual could have sold his tax-exempt obligations and bought
his units with the proceeds therefrom instead of keeping the tax-exempt obli-
12. I.R.C. § 103 (1984).
13. I.R.C. § 265(2) (1984).
14. As an example, a recent offering memorandum stated:
Tax-exempt Obligations. Section 265(2) of the Code disallows any deduction for
interest paid by a taxpayer on indebtedness incurred or continued for the purpose of
purchasing or carrying tax-exempt obligations. The Service announced in Revenue
Procedure 72-18 that the proscribed purpose will be deemed to exist with respect to
indebtedness incurred to finance another "portfolio investment" (which includes a
limited partnership interest) where the taxpayer also owns tax-exempt obligations.
Therefore, in the case of an investor owning tax exempt obligations, the Service
might take the position that the allocable portion of any interest incurred by the
investor to purchase or carry his interest in the partnership should be viewed as
incurred to enable him to continue carrying tax-exempt obligations, and that such
investor should not be allowed to deduct his full allocable share of such interest.
It is the opinion of Tax Counsel that, if an investor holds or acquires tax-exempt
obligations, unless such investment in tax-exempt obligations is insubstantial, it is
likely that a proportionate amount of any interest paid by such Investor on debt
incurred in connection with the purchase of an interest in the Partnerships will be
disallowed as a deduction under Section 265(2), and that, while the outcome of litiga-
tion cannot be predicted with certainty, it is more likely than not that, if the issue
were litigated, a court would so hold.
15. See Treas. Reg. § 1.265-2 (1967).
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gations and borrowing to purchase the units. This is the type of transaction
that Code section 265(2) was enacted to counteract.
16
On the other hand, a taxpayer holding tax-exempt obligations should be
able to deduct his allocable share of the interest on the nonrecourse loan
negotiated by the partnership. It is the leveraged position conferred by the
nonrecourse loan that is the principal business reason that a taxpayer invests
in a real estate limited partnership. It is unlikely that a taxpayer could, or
would, make the investment absent the leveraged position. That is, even if
the taxpayer were to sell his entire portfolio of tax-exempt obligations, he
would not use the cash realized to eliminate his allocable share of the loan
that enables him to hold his tax-exempt obligations. Therefore, Code section
265(2) should not be utilized by the Service to deny a taxpayer the interest
deduction of his allocable share of the nonrecourse loan, even if the taxpayer
maintains investments in tax-exempt obligations.
The remainder of the article will first discuss the relevant Revenue Proce-
dure 72-18, while showing that, even under the rationale provided by the
IRS, Code section 265(2) is not applicable to the interest paid by a partner in
a real estate tax shelter partnership. The article will then discuss the recent
cases on disallowance of interest deductions under Code section 265(2).
I. REVENUE PROCEDURE 72-18
Revenue Procedure 72-18'7 discusses guidelines for the application of
Code section 265(2). It states that direct evidence of a taxpayer's purpose of
incurring indebtedness to carry tax-exempt obligations exists where the obli-
gations are used as collateral for the indebtedness.1 8 This would not be the
case if a taxpayer were to make the contemplated investment in a real estate
limited partnership. Where, however, there is no direct evidence of a pur-
pose to carry tax exempt obligations, the revenue procedure provides that it
is necessary to look at the totality of facts and circumstances.' 9 If this in-
quiry supports a reasonable inference of the purpose to carry tax-exempt
obligations, then, pursuant to the Revenue Procedure 72-18, section 265(2)
of the Code will apply.2"
Section 4 of the revenue procedure provides guidelines for determining, in
the absence of direct evidence, whether an individual has incurred indebted-
ness in order to carry tax-exempt obligations. If an individual incurs either
16. Id.
17. Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 C.B. 740.
18. Id. at 741.
19. Id. at 740.
20. Id.
1984]
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short-term personal indebtedness for purchases of goods and services for
personal consumption, or long-term indebtedness for a mortgage incurred to
purchase or improve a residence, section 265(2) will generally not apply "be-
cause the purpose to purchase or carry tax-exempt obligations cannot rea-
sonably be inferred where a personal purpose unrelated to the tax-exempt
obligations ordinarily dominates the transaction."2 Likewise, where an in-
dividual incurs indebtedness in connection with the active conduct of a trade
or business (other than a dealer in tax-exempt obligations), Code section
265(2) will not ordinarily apply unless it is determined that the borrowing is
in excess of business needs.22
Section 3.05 of Revenue Procedure 72-18 discusses the inapplicability of
Code section 265(2) to an individual taxpayer who holds only insubstantial
amounts of tax-exempt obligations. 23 Insubstantial investment is presumed
"where during the taxable year the average amount of the tax-exempt obliga-
tions (valued at their adjusted basis) does not exceed 2% of the average ad-
justed basis of . . . [the individual] portfolio investments . . . [plus] any
assets held in the active conduct of a trade or business."' 24 This exception
applies only where there is no direct evidence linking indebtedness with a
purpose to purchase or to carry tax-exempt obligations.25
Section 4.04 of Revenue Procedure 72-18 provides:
a purpose to carry tax-exempt obligations will be inferred, unless
rebutted by other evidence, wherever the taxpayer has outstanding
indebtedness which is not directly connected with personal expend-
itures. . . and is not incurred or continued in connection with the
active conduct of a trade or business . . . and the taxpayer owns
tax-exempt obligations. This inference will be made even though
the indebtedness is ostensibly incurred or continued to purchase or
carry other portfolio investments.
A sufficiently direct relationship between the incurring or con-
tinuing of indebtedness and the purchasing or carrying of tax-ex-
empt obligations will generally exist where indebtedness is incurred
to finance portfolio investments because the choice of whether to
finance a new portfolio investment through borrowing or through
the liquidation of an existing investment in tax-exempt obligations
typically involves a purpose either to maximize profit or to main-
21. Id.
22. Id.; see also P.R. 83-32010 (interest payments deductible where taxpayer who owns
tax-exempt securities borrows to finance the purchase of real estate in connecton with an active
trade or business).
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tain a diversified portfolio. This purpose necessarily involves a de-
cision, whether articulated by the taxpayer or not, to incur (or
continue) the indebtedness, at least in part, to purchase or carry
the existing investment in tax-exempt obligations.
A taxpayer may rebut . . .[this] presumption . . . by establish-
ing that he could not have liquidated his holdings of tax-exempt
obligations in order to avoid incurring indebtedness.26
An analysis of the language of the revenue procedure leads to the conclu-
sion that a taxpayer may indeed invest in a limited partnership for the pur-
pose of garnering a real estate tax shelter and deduct his interest
expenditures on loans generated by the partnership notwithstanding his
holdings of tax-exempt securities. The rationale of the revenue procedure is
that the interest deduction will be disallowed because the taxpayer has a
"choice of whether to finance a new portfolio investment through borrowing
or through the liquidation of an existing investment in tax-exempt obliga-
tions."27 If a taxpayer owned tax-exempt obligations and borrowed money
from a bank in order to buy stock, the Internal Revenue Service correctly
would disallow the deduction for interest on the bank loan. The taxpayer
could have sold his tax-exempt obligations to finance the purchase of stock
instead of borrowing the money from the bank.2"
When a taxpayer invests in a real estate limited partnership, however, an
entirely different scenario is presented. The funds that are borrowed by the
partners hip (and attributed to the individual limited partner) supply the mo-
tivatior to most investors purchasing limited partnership interests to make
those purchases. The leveraging allowed by depreciation on the borrowed
money, in addition to the funds directly invested by the limited partner, is
the principal attraction of a real estate tax shelter limited partnership. Thus,
a limited partner generally would borrow funds through the partnership to
leverage his investment. Even if such a taxpayer sold every one of his tax-
exempt obligations, he would still borrow money through the partnership.
He would not use the funds realized from the sale of the tax-exempt obliga-
tions to pay the debt created by the partnership borrowing. Thus, the entire
rationale of the revenue procedure discussed above should not apply to a
taxpayer who owns tax-exempt obligations at the time the investment in a
real estate limited partnership is made. The taxpayer's choice is not whether
to finance his leveraged investment in the limited partnership through the
liquidation of his investments in tax-exempt obligations or through borrow-
ing. Rather, the choice is whether to invest at all in a limited partnership by
26. Id. at 741-42.
27. Id. at 742.
28. Id.
1984]
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borrowing money through the partnership.29
II. THE CASES
As expressed in judicial decisions beginning with Denman v. Slayton,3 ° the
purpose of I.R.C. section 265(2) is to prevent a taxpayer from reaping a
double tax benefit by deducting interest on borrowed funds that the taxpayer
uses to purchase or to carry obligations bearing tax-exempt interest. 3 1 It is
crucial to an understanding of Code section 265(2) that the Court has found
that Congress has proscribed the interest deduction only when there is a
purposive connection between the purchase or holding of tax-exempt obliga-
tions and the borrowing of money.12 The basis for the reasoning on this
issue is found in the legislative history of section 265(2) that clearly reveals
that Congress intended to disallow an interest deduction only upon a show-
ing that the indebtedness was either incurred or continued for the "purpose"
of acquiring or holding tax-exempt obligations.33 As stated by one commen-
tator, "[tihe history furnishes no support for the disallowance of interest on
indebtedness merely because the taxpayer owns tax-exempt obligations."34
Following the legislative intent, the courts have interpreted Code section
265(2) as requiring a "purposive connection" or a "sufficiently direct rela-
tionship" between a taxpayer's indebtedness and his ownership of tax-ex-
empt obligations. 35 Thus, it is settled that section 265(2) does not
29. Furthermore, a potential investor probably would be foreclosed from paying off the
bank loan by the partnership agreement to which he is a signatory.
30. 282 U.S. 514 (1931).
31. Id. at 519-20. This case also ruled the predecessor to I.R.C. § 265(2) constitutional.
Id. at 518-19 considering § 214(a)(2), 42 Stat. 239 of the Revenue Act of 1921). See also Levitt
v. United States, 517 F.2d 1339, 1343-44 (8th Cir. 1975); Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock
Corp. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 222, 229 (E.D. Va. 1971).
32. Denman, 282 U.S. at 519.
33. For an excellent discussion of the legislative history, see Craven, Disallowance of In-
terest Deduction to Owner of Tax-Exempt Bonds, 24 THE TAX LAW. 287, 287-89 (1971). The
earliest version of I.R.C. § 265(2) appeared in § 1201(1) of the Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L.
No. 65-50, 40 Stat. 300, 330, which amended § 5(a) cl. Second of the Revenue Act of 1916 to
preclude the deduction of interest on "indebtedness incurred for the purchase of obligations or
securities the interest upon which is exempt from taxation as income under this title." In years
subsequent to the adoption of the predecessor to I.R.C. § 265(2), the House attempted to elim-
inate the "purpose" test by proposing amendments to the statute that would have allowed a
deduction only for interest paid in excess of the amount of income interest received by a tax-
payer from tax-exempt securities. The Senate rejected these amendments and prevailed over
the House. See Craven, supra at 287-89; see also, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess.
10 (1918); S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 6-7 (1918); H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 21 (1924); S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1924).
34. Craven, supra note 33, at 289.
35. See, e.g., Swenson Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 686, 696 (1975); see
also Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 420, 422 (7th Cir. 1968); Illinois
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automatically bar an interest deduction "merely because a taxpayer incurred
or continued indebteness at the same time that he held tax-exempt
securities."
3 6
Any other construction of section 265(2) would serve no purpose. The
reason for the Code provision is to disallow a taxpayer from claiming a de-
duction for the interest paid on the borrowed funds while using those funds
to buy tax-exempt obligations. If such interest deductions were allowed, se-
rious economic dislocations would certainly follow.37 However, if there is
insufficient connection between the borrowed funds and the ownership or
purchase of tax-exempt obligations, that is, if a taxpayer is not able to buy or
to hold tax-exempt obligations because he has an outstanding loan, invoca-
tion of Code section 265(2) would be unreasonable. 38 Thus, the courts have
held that where the facts establish that the indebtedness is independent of
the holding of tax-exempt obligations, the prohibited purpose of a manipula-
tive double tax benefit will not be found.39
The test imposed by the courts' for the requisite purpose is generally one
of facts and circumstances. 4' A similar test should be invoked when a tax-
Terminal R.R. v. United States, 375 F.2d 1016, 1021 (Ct. CI. 1967); Baker v. Commissioner,
75 T.C. 166, 172 (1980).
36. Mariorenzi v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 92, 93 (1st Cir. 1974), cited with approval in
Levitt v. United States, 517 F.2d 1339, 1344 (8th Cir. 1975); Handy Button Machine Co. v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 846, 852 (1974).
37. Posit a rational taxpayer A in a tax world absent I.R.C. § 265(2). He certainly would
borrow every dollar possible to buy tax-exempt obligations. Suppose A is a 50% taxpayer.
From a bank he borrows $100,000 at 16% interest and uses the funds borrowed to purchase
tax-exempt securities which pay 9%. Assuming the principal of the loan is not repaid, A's
payments to the bank are $16,000 per year. His interest deduction of 50% produces a real
outlay (payment to bank less interest deduction from income) of $8,000 per year. His tax free
return on his investment is $9,000 per year, producing $1,000 per year in his pocket for doing
nothing but negotiating a loan and purchasing securities.
38. If the Tax Code is not being manipulated by a taxpayer in order to benefit doubly
from interest deductions and from tax-free income, the Service should not interfere with the
interest deduction.
39. See Investors Diversified Services v. United States, 575 F.2d 843, 855 (Ct. Cl. 1978);
New Mexico Bancorporation v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1342, 1357 (1980); cf Wisconsin
Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 420, 422-23 (7th Cir. 1968).
40. The taxpayer has the burden of proving his legitimate purpose for incurring or contin-
uing his indebtedness. Handy Button Machine Co., 61 T.C. at 852.
41. There are two factual circumstances where the courts generally infer the requisite
purposive connection. The first is when the proceeds of the borrowing are traceable directly to
the purchase of tax-exempt obligations. See, e.g., Wynn v. United States, 411 F.2d 614, 615
(3d Cir. 1969); Kirchner, Moore & Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 940, 944 (1970); Bishop v.
Commissioner, 41 T.C. 154, 158-59 (1963). Similarly, most courts have disallowed the interest
deduction where tax-exempt obligations are used as collateral for the indebtedness. See, e.g.,
Levitt, 517 F.2d at 1342-43, 1345; Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc., 388 F.2d at 422; but see New
Mexico Bancorporation, 74 T.C. at 1353; cf R.B. George Machinery Co. v. Commissioner, 26
B.T.A. 594 (1932).
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payer who owns tax-exempt obligations claims a deduction for interest pay-
ments on his ratable share of a limited partnership loan.
Of primary importance is Israelson v. United States,42 where the taxpayer
had extensive holdings in tax-exempt obligations. The court considered in-
terest deductions on two types of loans. The first was a bank loan, the pro-
ceeds of which were used to make charitable contributions, purchase stocks
and bonds, and for general personal and business expenses.43 The court
found that the taxpayer could have avoided the bank borrowing by selling
his tax-exempt obligations and that, therefore, "the interest paid . . . on the
bank loan. . . was interest on indebtedness purposefully incurred or contin-
ued to carry the tax-exempt bonds." 44 As a consequence, the interest was
not deductible.45
The second type of loan incurred by the taxpayer was purchase money
mortgages obtained as part payment for real estate purchases. 46 Notwith-
standing the taxpayer's tax-exempt holdings, the court held that the interest
paid on the mortgage notes was deductible. The court reasoned that "[s]uch
mortgages are a customary method of financing such purchases, if not the
customary method.",47 The court seemed to imply that borrowings made in
the ordinary course of business would nullify, ipso facto, the prohibited pur-
posive connection between borrowing and holding of tax-exempt obligations
that section 265(2) was inacted to counteract. In other words, if the exigen-
cies of business are such that everyone makes an investment in a certain way,
a court should not infer a purpose of borrowing to carry tax-exempt obliga-
tions. Such reasoning, standing alone, would appear to be incorrect. Pursu-
ant to Revenue Procedure 72-18, in the context of a trade or business, the
intent to carry tax-exempt obligations will be inferred when the taxpayer
could reasonably have foreseen at the time of purchasing the obligations that
indebtedness probably would have to be incurred to meet the ordinary, re-
current economic needs of the business.
Of greater import is the second reason that the Israelson court found to
hold the mortgage note interest deductible: "Moreover, although Taxpayer
engaged in the real estate transactions as an investor, in each instance he was
a member of a joint venture and necessarily considered the desires of his
fellow venturers as to how the respective purchases should be financed.
' 48
42. 367 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Md. 1973).
43. Id. at 1106-07.
44. Id. at 1107.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1106.
47. Id. at 1107.
48. Id.
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Getting along with fellow venturers in an investment was considered by the
court to evidence lack of a connection between the purchase money mort-
gage and the tax-exempt obligations. Whether the court was lax in its use of
the term "desires" rather than "demands" of his fellow venturers is impor-
tant only insofar as a taxpayer in Israelson's shoes is, or is not, able to meet
his burden of proving the absence of purposive connection. In the context of
a real estate limited partnership, where the agreement mandates that the
partnership borrow money, it is not merely the desires of the other partners
that a taxpayer must respect, but their demands. Absent agreement on this
essential condition, a prospective taxpayer will not be allowed into the part-
nership. This is a business reason for borrowing money far greater in impact
than satisfying the "desires" of fellow investors. Therefore, Israelson is cen-
tral to a discussion of real estate limited partnerships.
In Estate of Dellora A. Norris,49 the taxpayer, while maintaining invest-
ments in tax-exempt obligations, borrowed money from a bank in order to
pay her taxes. The court held that Code section 265(2) was not applicable
and that the interest payments on the bank loan were deductible. 50 The
court noted that the bank loan was specifically earmarked to pay the taxes
and that the taxpayer had no motivation to create tax-exempt income or to
obtain a double benefit. 5' Likewise, in the tax shelter context, any loans
made by the partnership that flow through to the taxpayer would be specifi-
cally earmarked for partnership activities. Finally, the court in Norris stated
that the borrowing evidenced good business judgment and, "therefore, [was]
motivated by business considerations wholly unrelated to her tax-exempt
holdings."' 12 Therefore, any loan proceeds that flow through to a taxpayer
who has invested in a real estate limited partnership would be wholly unre-
lated to his tax-exempt holdings.
In New Mexico Bancorporation v. Commissioner,53 the tax court articu-
lated the following tests for the application of Code section 265(2):
Section 265(2) does not apply unless the facts reveal that the
purpose of incurring or continuing indebtedness is to purchase or
carry tax-exempt securities. Such prohibited purpose must be es-
tablished by the showing of a sufficiently direct relationship be-
tween the indebtedness and the exempt securities. Evidence that
indebtedness was incurred at the same time the tax-exempt securi-
ties were held is not enough to establish the requisite prohibited
49. 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 408 (1981).
50. Id. at 414-15, 417.
51. Id. at 415.
52. Id.
53. 74 T.C. 1342 (1980).
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purpose. A more direct nexus must be shown. For example, sec-
tion 265(2) should not be applied to disallow an interest deduction
where indebtedness is incurred for substantial business reasons in-
dependent of the purposes for which exempt obligations are held. 'In
a word, where the issue is disputed there should always be an in-
quiry, more-or-less particularized, into the connection and rela-
tionship between the tax-exempts and the indebtedness so as to
discover whether in fact the taxpayer used borrowed funds for the
primary purpose of purpose of purchasing or carrying those
securities.' 54
Thus, it is clear that were a taxpayer to invest in a limited partnership, the
partnership loan proceeds passed through to him would certainly be "in-
curred for substantial business reasons independent of the purposes for
which exempt obligations are held." 5 Moreover, it is equally clear that the
taxpayer would not have used the borrowed funds for the primary purpose
of purchasing or carrying tax-exempt obligations, but rather to leverage his
investment in the partnership. Thus, the taxpayer's potential investment
would fall totally outside of the scope of Code section 265(2).
In Baker v. Commissioner,56 the taxpayer obtained interest-free loans from
his corporation over a three-year period to pay estimated taxes. The court
held that Code section 265(2) was not applicable because the loans were used
to make estimated tax payments and there was no showing of any nexus
between the indebtedness and the tax-exempt securities. 57 Likewise, a tax-
payer who invests in a real estate limited partnership could clearly show that
the purpose of the loans is peculiar to his investment in the partnership and
has nothing to do with his holding of tax-exempt obligations.
In Swenson Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner,58 the corporation in-
curred interest expenses due to outstanding bond long-term indebtedness.
The corporation was empowered to prepay in whole or in part on December
31st of each year. During several of the years in which the corporation had
outstanding bond indebtedness, it invested large portions of its available
funds in short-term tax-exempt securities. The court held that the corpora-
tion did not incur or continue its indebtedness for the purpose of carrying
tax-exempt securities as contemplated by Code section 265(2). 59 In so hold-
ing, the court emphasized that the corporation's decision not to prepay any
54. Id. at 1352-53 (quoting Investors Diversified Servs. v. United States, 575 F.2d 843,
848 (Ct. CI. 1978)) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 1353.
56. 75 T.C. 166 (1980).
57. Id. at 171-72.
58. 64 T.C. 686 (1975).
59. Id. at 700.
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of its bond indebtedness reflected business judgment: "In support of this,
petitioner asserts that even if it had liquidated its holdings in tax-exempt
securities at that time, it would not have prepaid any of its debt in view of
the business needs." 6
Thus, should a taxpayer invest in a real estate limited partnership, even if
he liquidated all his holdings in tax-exempt securities, he would not prepay
any of the debt imputed to him through the partnership, because of the busi-
ness exigencies connected with the investment in the partnership. The linch-
pin of the tax court's decision in Swenson appears to be the taxpayer's
contention that even if it had sold the tax-exempt securities it would not
have repaid the debt.6 ' This is clearly the correct holding because Code
section 265(2) specifically applies only when "the purpose for which the in-
debtedness is incurred or continued is to purchase or carry tax-exempt
obligations."
62
In Levitt v. United States,63 the taxpayer borrowed money from a bank to
buy Treasury bonds while he held tax-exempt securities which could have
been liquidated to pay off the bank loan. The court stated: "§ 265(2) pre-
vents a taxpayer from simultaneously paying no tax on income from tax-
exempt securities and deducting interest on loans that he would not be incur-
ring or continuing but for his desire to acquire or carry the tax exempts. '
In the case of a taxpayer investing in a real estate limited partnership, there
is no "but for." Even if the taxpayer sold the tax-exempt securities, he
would still borrow through the partnership. The court in Levitt quoted with
approval the district court's finding that "[t]here is no good business reason,
other than the desire to carry tax-exempt securities, offered why the tax-
exempts or trust income were not used . . . to purchase the government
bonds rather than borrow additional sums from the bank.",65 Unlike the
situation in Levitt, however, there is a very good business reason why capital
raised through liquidation of a taxpayer's tax-exempt securities would not be
utilized to pay off a loan flowing through to him from a limited partnership.
The reason is that it is only because of the leveraging afforded him by such a
loan that a purchase of a limited partnership interest of the sort contem-
plated is economically rational to an investor in the taxpayer's position.
That section 265(2) does not apply when a taxpayer cannot reduce his
indebtedness through the sale of tax-exempt securities is reiterated in Inves-
60. Id. at 696.
61. Id. at 700.
62. Leslie v. Commissioner, 413 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).
63. 517 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1975).
64. Id. at 1344 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 1344 n.7.
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tors Diversified Services v. United States.66 The court in Investors stated that
"[t]his inability to affect the amount of its indebtedness supports our view
that the relationship between the certificates (representing the indebtedness)
and the tax exempts is too remote for section 265(2) to apply."' 67 That is, if
the government can show that a taxpayer has the ability to avoid borrowing
by sale of his tax-exempt securities, Code section 265(2) might apply. 68 If a
taxpayer invested in the limited partnership, however, he could not avoid
borrowing through the partnership by selling his tax-exempt securities.
Thus, the rationale for the application of Code section 265(2) would not
exist.
Finally, in Ball v. Commissioner,69 the tax court reaffirmed the doctrine
that there must be a "sufficiently direct relationship" between the debt and
the carrying of tax exempts in order for interest deductions to be disallowed
under Code section 265(2). In Ball, the tax court allowed interest deduc-
tions where a taxpayer having an investment portfolio totaling more than six
million dollars, of which approximately five percent were in tax-exempts,
borrowed money in order to create profitable investments without regard to
tax considerations and with "no direct relationship to creating tax-exempt
income."7° The Ball court emphasized:
All of petitioner's loans were used to finance major, non-recur-
ring opportunities which were conducive to long-term financing,
and were not foreseeable when the tax-exempt securities were
purchased. Business reasons were the sole motivation for petition-
ers incurring indebtedness to finance new ventures. Petitioner
owned what both he and his investment advisor considered to be
an 'absolute minimum' of tax-exempt securities during the entire
taxable period. A reasonable person in his position would not neces-
sarily have sacrificed the liquidity and security provided by his tax-
exempt holdings by liquidating these holdings instead of incurring
indebtedness to finance his ventures.7"
III. CONCLUSION
Many taxpayers may find themselves in the position of owning both tax-
exempt securities and investments in limited partner real estate tax shelters.
These taxpayers should not be penalized, because they own tax-exempt se-
66. 575 F.2d 843 (Ct. CI. 1978).
67. Id. at 853.
68. Cf Israelson v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Md. 1973). See supra notes 42-
48 and accompanying text.
69. 54 T.C. 1200 (1970).
70. Id. at 1209.
71. Id. at 1209 (emphasis added).
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curities, by loss of their deduction for interest paid on non-recourse loans
generated by the partnership. In fact, these taxpayers have no choice but to
incur an interest cost if they are to remain partners in the real estate invest-
ment. Such an investment is independent from an investment in tax-exempt
securities. Moreover, no relationship exists between these two investments.
Therefore, because these loans are negotiated in the partnership's regular
course of business and because the proceeds of the sale of the tax-exempt
securities would and could not be utilized to reduce the debt and interest
payments, Code section 265(2) should not be applicable to such a taxpayer.

